TUNESS Chart of the Week (TCW), Monday May 13, 2013
As the events in the Chaambi region continue to unfold, local population has discovered in an unequivocal manner how poorly equipped the military forces of the country are in the face of a domestic threat to its national security. Despite the genuine efforts and the heroic goodwill of the national troops to secure a very strategic zone of the national territory (bordering a contiguous and potentially unstable country) most attempts have failed so far to ensure a total control over this region. In this note, we shed some light on one and perhaps most important cause of this failure, that’s the absence of a clear political agenda to provide the adequate financial and logistic resources to the military forces to cope with any domestic or foreign threat.
This situation is by no means a recent finding. Rather, this is the result of decades of marginalization of the military forces, very often in favor of other security forces (e.g. police, counter terrorism forces) that have benefited from the special treatment of the former regime. The latter, fearing a growing power of the military branch and thus an eminent threat raising from its leaders’ ambitions to seize power (as shown during the Barraket Sahel episode early 1990’s) has managed to constantly reduce the resources allocated to the military troops. Such a strategy has, over the years, limited dramatically the capacity of the military to carry out its role. Moreover, in an attempt to secure the allegiance of the military leaders (and contain their greediness) the former regime, numerous reports have shown, had over the years provided “reasonable wages and additional benefits for its career officers, but has done little to turn its many 12-month conscripts into effective soldiers”. This strategy while increasing the opportunity cost associated with any “undesired” actions by the military leaders, will certainly limit any incentive the latter may have given the inadequate training and insufficient equipment their troops possess.
Undoubtedly, while the deliberate strategy of the former regime to secure its ruling as described above is an important factor to explain the current state of the military, other reasons more orthodox have also played a role. (a) The extended period of peace with neighboring countries since the independence (interrupted occasionally by some political tensions e.g. Libya late 1970’s); (b) the limited natural resources of the countries that have constrained the capacity of the government to finance efficiently and uniformly its various branches and; (c) the urgent needs to respond to internal demands from a growing young and educated population, are among the few factors often cited to explain the sidelining of the military forces in the country, their improper training and the low support and logistics they have been receiving from the executive power for decades.
Chart 1 above highlights the latest trends in the military spending in Tunisia and in its neighboring countries. The Military expenditures data include all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects. These expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development. As can be seen above, of the total sample under study, Tunisia appears to be the country with the lowest investment spending in the modernization and recapitalization of its military forces over the last 20 years. In contrast to the Tunisian experience Alegeria and Morocco for instance have increased or at least maintained their levels of military expenditures. It’s worth noting that this trend is largely explained in the case for the former by a decade of civil war that broke out early 1990’s and the ongoing political tensions and military threats between the latter and the Polesario.
Recent report from the Centre for Strategy and International studies has shown that Tunisia, as opposed to other countries of the regions has made “no major orders over the 1994-2009 period and only shows deliveries during 1994-1997 and 2002-2005 periods – although the amounts involved are so small that they scarcely constitute a military build-up”. According to the same study (highlighted in chart 2), the total military delivery for Tunisia over the last 16 years did not exceed the $300million. To put things into perspective, this amount toped US $10 billion for Algeria (mainly imported from Russia), $1.5 billion for Morocco (mainly from the US) and $ 900 million for Libya (despite the embargo).
Table 1 provides an additional support to our argument above regarding the significant disparity currently found between the military strength and capabilities of the Tunisian troops compared to their peers in neighboring countries. The figures, which will discussed in more details in our next contributions, are simply striking!! All countries of the region, with no single exception, appear to outnumber or outperform the manpower and the defense forces (Land, Naval, Air) in Tunisia. This finding applies across the board for all weapons and military categories.
While this note is a first and rudimentary contribution, it remains nevertheless very important attempt to understand the current state of the military forces in our country. It underscores all difficulties that face our military troops to carry out their duties on a daily basis when dealing with external and internal enemies. It also emphasizes all the courage and superhuman efforts our brave troops are making on the grounds to fill this gap and compensate for the dramatic lack of resources, support and logistics they deserve.
Table 1. Summary comparative table of the military capabilities of North African countries
This note is prepared by TUNESS Research Team.